



What do the various kinds of limits ACTUALLY tell the worker who knows what concentration s/he is being exposed to, but wants to know how dangerous it is?

• The OSHA PELs actually indicate levels that lawyers and economists decided were economically feasible for most or all employers to meet! There is lots of cutting-edge risk science in the *Preambles* to the PELs, but the numerical limits themselves reflect (anemic) determinations about feasibility. (the word "anemic" in this paragraph is a personal judgment based on my 12 years at OSHA– every other word is, I assert, unimpeachable)

• The ACGIH TLVs indicate levels that very smart, energetic, and creative volunteers together decided met some unknown balance of "reasonable assurance of safety" and reasonable achievability in the workplace. Every such judgment is chemical-specific, not generic.

• At concentrations above or below the PEL or TLV, no knowledge about *how* safe or *how* dangerous is or can be transmitted.

The leaders and rank-and-file of the occupational health world are estranged from risk assessment, and the rift is widening:

• long-standing moral distaste for risk assessment among labor unions, OSHA, NIOSH, etc.;

• tendency to blame risk assessment for delays and failures in the regulatory process;

• belief among many in corporate OHS that risk assessment is "voodoo" (see next slide)

• (mistaken) belief that risk assessment is overly "conservative" (see any of 8-10 articles by AMF on this issue);

• unflatteringly defensive posture ("with us or against us") from the TLV Committee and AIHA;

• rise (esp. internationally) of "control banding" and other qualitative "alternatives" to risk assessment







Principled Objections to Quantifying Occupational Risk (from email to author from a leading industrial hygienist in the UK): "We have an ethical duty and in most cases a legal duty to explain the risks to health to employees, but I don't believe that we have sufficient information available to quantify the risk even for a group of employees, let alone for an individual.<sup>1</sup> Then there's also an issue about the perception of risk to be considered. We can quantify the risk of dying from smoking, from walking across the street, from traveling in a plane, etc., but do people really consider those estimates of risk in how they live their lives?"<sup>2</sup> [Answers: 1: nops. 2: yup] But what about the 150 or so OTHER workers who die each day, from chronic disease due to occupational exposures??



## WORKERS MEMORIAL DAY 2011













Vhat might a compendium of ap	oprox.	500 1	risk-b	ased OELs look like?
Concentrations that prese	nt an exces	s lifetin	e risk of 1	0-3
TABLE Z-1 LIM	ITS FOR	AIR CO	NTAMINA	NTS
1		Ē		
Substance	CAS No. (d)	ppm (a)	mg/m <sup>2</sup> (b)	
Acetaldehyde	75-07-0	100 180	150 270	
Acetic acid	64-19-7	10	25	
Acetic anhydride	108-24-7	5		
Acetone	67-64-1	750	1800 10	
Acetonitrile	75-05-8	40 70 4	0 105	
2-Acetylaminofluorene; see 1910.1014	53-96-3			
Acetylene dichloride; see 1,2-Dichloroethylene				
Acetylene tetrabromide	79-27-6	1	14	
Acrolein	107-02-8	0.1 0.1	5	
Acrylamide	79-06-1	0.03		
Acrylonitrile; see 1910.1045	107-13-1			
Aldrin	309-00-2	0.25		
Allyl alcohol	107-18-6	2541	0	
Allyl chloride	107-05-1	1 3 2 (		
Allyl glycidyl ether (AGE)	106-92-3	5	22	
Allyl propyl disulfide	2179-59-1	2	12	
alpha-Alumina	1344-28-1			
Total dust			10	
Respirable fraction			5	

The OSHA Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) are:

• in roughly 410 ex. 425 instances, "archived" versions of the ACGIH TLVs, frozen in time from 45 years ago;

• in the other 16 cases, set via formal rulemaking– a process, replete with QRA information, in which the science has almost NOTHING to do with the setting of the PEL.

[in the subsequent slides, remember that in every other risk-regulatory arena, we look at the RfC *DIVIDED BY* the legal limit or the prevailing exposures (the "margin of exposure" or "hazard quotient" concepts)]

Many of us (see, e.g., Chapter 5 in the NAS **Science and Decisions** report) believe that the "divide by 100 and pray" method of setting non-cancer exposure limits is insufficiently protective. For those substances where humans are truly 10x more sensitive than test animals, and for those humans who are truly 10x more susceptible than the median person, their risk at the NOAEL/100 (the RfC) will be the SAME as the animals' risk at the NOAEL– which is to say, perhaps 5-10 chances **per 100**.

*Therefore*, exposures 10, 100, 1000 times HIGHER than the RfC may be barbaric.



(most of the PELs are between 50 and 50,000 times the EPA RfC– a factor of 1000 dispersion about this "gold standard" of non-cancer risk)



The TLVs are Unrelated to Non-Cancer or Cancer Risk Benchmarks:						
	Ratio TLV/RfC (N=91)	Adjusted Can at TLV	cer Risk			
min.	2.5	4.1x10 <sup>-6</sup>				
5 <sup>th</sup> %ile	17	1.8x10 <sup>-5</sup>				
25 <sup>th</sup> %ile	84	6.9x10 <sup>-4</sup>				
median	500	5.5x10 <sup>-3</sup>				
75 <sup>th</sup> %ile	1,770	2.5x10 <sup>-2</sup>	. An			
95 <sup>th</sup> %ile	11,040	4.4x10 <sup>-2</sup>	St. Dan			
max.	200,000	5.1x10 <sup>-2</sup>	the particular			
(ratio 95 <sup>th</sup> /5 <sup>th</sup> )	650	2440				







#### 1-Bromopropane: no PEL, TLV=10 ppm

• CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (12/5/08) published a case report of a 43-year-old man in NJ who had recently begun dry cleaning with "DrySolv"(1-BP)– hospitalized with headaches, fatigue, visual disturbances, twitching, and joint pain– also a PA man hospitalized with ataxia and neuropathy (1-BP levels in his degreasing operation approx. 175 ppm);

• *Journal of Envt'l and Occup'l Medicine* (9/07) reported on 4 furniture workers using 1-BP glue (18 - 254 ppm in air) who developed inability to walk, pain, numbness, vomiting– persisting for up to 8 years after leaving workplace;

• Majersik et al (2007) reported that 6 workers exposed to roughly 100 ppm 1-BP while gluing furniture developed chronic neuropathic pain, persisting for years after leaving their workplaces.

• *European J Endocrinology* (1998) reported on 16 Korean workers using 2-BP who developed primary ovarian failure.



From draft ACGIH TLV Basis Document for 1-Bromopropane, 11/18/2010: (note: current TLV is 10 ppm)

• "A TLV-TWA of 0.1 ppm\* should provide protection against the potential for neurotoxicity, ... in 1-bromopropane exposed workers."

• "A study of 60 female workers in four 1-BP factories demonstrated dose-dependent neurological and hematological effects of 1-BP exposure with a LOAEL of 1.28 ppm for loss of vibration sense in toes (Li et al 2010b)."

My comments: 0.1 ppm is a laudably protective level compared to the current TLV, to EPA's 25 ppm recommendation, and to OSHA's "TSTL"\* recommendation, but as a quantitative exercise...

1. Huh?!

2.  $1.28 \div 10$  (LOAEL to NOAEL)  $\div 10$  (intraspecies susceptibility) = 0.013 ppm

3. By my analysis of the new 1-BP cancer bioassay,  $10^{-4}$  excess cancer risk level = 0.06 ppm

\* ("the sky's the limit")

# A Not-Atypical Rationale for TLV Selection: (Isopropanol, 2003)

The TLV is set on the basis of avoidance of ocular and upper respiratory tract irritation. Few human studies have been completed and sample sizes were relatively small; available human studies have suggested a LOAEL of 400 ppm resulting in mild irritation of the eyes, nose, and throat or subtle changes in postural sway... The lowest chronic NOAEL in rodents is 500 ppm. The lowest applicable subchronic LOAEL in rodents is 500 ppm, based on obvious upper respiratory tract irritation, with a NOAEL of 100 ppm.

A TLV–TWA of 200 ppm and a STEL of 400 ppm are recommended for isopropanol. The TLV–TWA recommendations should minimize the potential for objective narcotic effects, significant irritation of the eyes or upper respiratory tract, or systemic toxicity.

#### Other recent TLV "rationales":

• insoluble Cr<sup>6</sup> componds (2004)– TLV of 10 ug/m<sup>3</sup>– although a cancer risk assessment suggested a  $10^{-4}$  excess lifetime risk level would instead be 0.008 ug/m<sup>3</sup> (1/1250<sup>th</sup> of the TLV), this calculation may be "seriously in error" (note– OSHA risk assessment in 2006 estimated a risk of about  $4x10^{-5}$  at 0.008 ug/m<sup>3</sup>...)

• acetaldehyde (2011)– ceiling of 25 ppm, because "irritation occurs at levels much below concentrations that have been shown to cause long-term effects"– except for the implications of the adenocarcinomas in rats at 750 ppm...

• hydrogen fluoride (2005)– TLV of 0.5 ppm, although irritation and lavage fluid changes documented at 1-3 ppm

• TDI (2003)– TLV of 5 ppb, although FEV<sub>1</sub> of those exposed > 3.5 ppb was reduced by an average of 200 ml...



- 1/20 of a LOAEL that "will be a NOAEL";
- $\frac{1}{2}$  of a frank effect level;
- 1/10 of a frank effect level;
- 1/3 of a frank effect level;
- •1/70<sup>th</sup> of a NOAEL (**now** we're talkin'...)
- 1/3 of (4-week) NOAEL

Common Misconceptions About (and Distortions of) the NAS "Silver Book" (Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment)

- we recommended that EPA (and other agencies) treat all adverse human health effects as always obeying a straight-line dose-response function, from the highest laboratory dose down to zero;
- we urged EPA to retain its current "default" assumptions used in risk assessment, and to resist departing from them in favor of new information;
- we want political managers to dictate how risk and cost-benefit analyses will be conducted.



Example Risk-Based OEL for a Carcinogen (Perchloroethylene):

• linear term of multistage dose-response polynomial = 1.46x10<sup>-3</sup> per ppm (upper 95<sup>th</sup> percentile)

• adjust by  $(10/20 \text{ m}^3/\text{day}) (5/7 \text{ days}) (45/70 \text{ yr}) = 3.35 \times 10^{-4} \text{ per ppm}$ 

• Therefore, **2.98 ppm** corresponds to an excess cancer risk of 10<sup>-3</sup>

• [note: PEL= 100 ppm; TLV = 25 ppm; new Philadelphia limit (residential neighbors) = 40 ppb]

#### Recommended Default for Interindividual Variability in Cancer Susceptibility

An assumption that the distribution is lognormal is reasonable, as is an assumption of a difference of a factor of 10-50 between median and upper 95th percentile people, as indicated by the series of examples provided in Chapter 4. It is clear that the difference is significantly greater than a factor of 1, the current implicit assumption in cancer risk assessment. In the absence of further research leading to more accurate distributional values or chemical-specific information, the committee recommends that EPA adopt a default distribution or fixed adjustment value for use in cancer risk assessment. A factor of 25 would be a reasonable default value to assume as a ratio between the median and upper 95th percentile persons' cancer sensitivity for the low-dose linear case, as would be a default lognormal distribution. A factor of twenty-five could be interpreted as a factor of 10 for pharmacokinetic variability, and a factor of 2.5 for pharmacodynamic variability.

The suggested default of 25 will have the effect of increasing the population risk (average risk) relative to the median person's risk by a factor of 6.8: For a lognormal distribution, the mean to median ratio is equal to  $\exp(\sigma^2/2)$ . When the 95th percentile to median ratio is 25,

 $\sigma$  is 1.96 [=ln(25)/1.645], and the mean exceeds the median by a factor of 6.8. If the risk to the median human were estimated to be 10<sup>-6</sup>, and a population of one-million persons were exposed, the expected number of cases of cancer would be 6.8 rather than 1.0.

Thus under this new default, the value for the median person would remain as provided by the current approach to cancer risk assessment; for a default of a factor of 25, the average would be higher by a factor of 6.8. It would be important for the cancer risk assessment to express interindividual variability by showing the median and average population risks, as well as the range of individual risks for risk-management consideration.





Example Risk-Based OEL for a Non-Carcinogen (Phosgene) [*adapted from Box 5-2 of Science and Decisions*, NAS 2009]: • 0.2 ppm is LOAEL for bronchiolar fibrosis in rats (12 weeks); • EPA calculated BMD<sub>10</sub> = 0.1 ppm (=170 µg/m<sup>3</sup>) • BMDL<sub>10</sub>= 0.018 ppm (=30 µg/m<sup>3</sup>) • RfC = 30 ÷ 10 ÷ 10 = 0.3 µg/m<sup>3</sup> NAS method: • 170 ÷ 2 (subchronic-chronic) = 85 µg/m<sup>3</sup> • x (20/10)(7/5)(70/45) = 370 µg/m<sup>3</sup> •  $\sigma_{animal BMD} = log(170/30) \div 1.645 = 0.46$ •  $\sigma_{A-H pharmacodynamics} = 0.42$ •  $\sigma_{subchron-chron} = 0.34$ •  $\sigma_{human}^2 = 0.46^2 + 0.42^2 + 0.34^2 = 0.5036$ ; therefore  $\sigma_{human} = 0.71$ • lower bound on BMD<sub>10</sub> = 370 ÷ 10<sup>(1.645)(0.71)</sup> = 25 µg/m<sup>3</sup>

- therefore,  $10^{-3}$  risk level =  $25 \div (0.1/0.001) = 0.25 \ \mu g/m^3$
- Note: TLV currently set at 400  $\mu$ g/m<sup>3</sup>



General Duty Authority Enforcement:

NOT the Center for Progressive Reform recommendation (cite first-instance for substances with TLVs but no PELs),

but: (1) create or annex risk-based OELs

(2) document via inspection an exceedance of OEL

- (3) identify feasible means of controlling to OEL
- (4) thereby establish employer's general duty to control to OEL upon *subsequent* inspection(s)

This would be labor-intensive, slow, incremental progress towards reducing occupational exposures— in other words,

vastly better than nothing.

### OSHA *RARELY* ISSUES "GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE" VIOLATIONS FOR HEALTH HAZARDS

From 1998-2008 (federal and state-run programs combined), OSHA issued **19,894** GDC violations. Of these, ...

• One (1) cited overexposure to a carcinogen (B-estradiol at a drug co.)

• Six (6) cited risk of cancer (2 for sunlight, 1 for wood dust, 1 for TCDD, 2 for cytotoxic drugs)

• Thirty (30) cited any exceedance of any TLV®

- 8 of these were for heat stress
- 6 were for ammonia
- 1 each for CO, welding fume, FeSO<sub>4</sub>, R-123, MDI

[37/19894 < 0.2%]

## Conclusion:

We have not "evolved beyond" the need to assess, communicate, and reduce risk: modern scientific methods are SLIGHTLY more complicated than control banding and other qualitative measures, and HUGELY more informative, useful, efficient, and responsive to the reasonable expectations of Congress, the courts, and the public.